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| CFJ: | 2701 |
| Interest Index: | 0 |
| Statement: | The LNP is a player |
| Caller: | ais523 |
| |
| Judge: | Tiger |
| Judgement: | |
| |
| Currently Eligible: | (none) |
| |
| Pending: | Decision by Tiger (24 Nov 2009 11:45:40 GMT) |
History:
| Called by ais523 | 20 Sep 2009 23:04:59 GMT |
| Assigned to ə | 23 Sep 2009 22:23:20 GMT |
| ə recused | 12 Oct 2009 23:41:14 GMT |
| Assigned to BobTHJ | 14 Oct 2009 18:03:45 GMT |
| BobTHJ recused | 21 Oct 2009 19:24:16 GMT |
| Assigned to Yally | 25 Oct 2009 16:23:40 GMT |
| Yally recused | 7 Nov 2009 19:16:37 GMT |
| Assigned to Warrigal | 7 Nov 2009 19:18:27 GMT |
| Warrigal recused | 17 Nov 2009 11:44:41 GMT |
| Assigned to Tiger | 17 Nov 2009 11:45:40 GMT |
Caller's Arguments: | | (20 Sep 2009 23:04:59 GMT) |
On Thu, 2009-09-17 at 15:58 -0500, Pavitra wrote:
> This may possibly save you, but I'm still not convinced that "to intend"
> is a proper action, despite its grammatical status as a verb. In its
> natural-language meaning, which I maintain that the Rules do not
> overwrite, "I intend" is a description of a passive mental state, like
> "I understand" or "I doubt". It's not an activity that can be either
> effective or ineffective, like lifting a box or spending a coin.
>
> In short, I am arguing that intent is (1) like contracts, recognized
> rather than defined by the Rules; and (2) a passive mental state, like
> the state of a switch, rather than an action, like flipping the state of
> a switch.
If Pavitra's argument above is correct, then partnerships
cannot intend to perform dependent actions (allegedly a non-action)
without the text of a message that would let them do it being published.
Gratuitous Arguments by Pavitra: | | (21 Sep 2009 04:41:49 GMT) |
If a contract provides an internal mechanism for accomplishing X, then
beginning that formal, contract-defined process causes the contract to
intend to do X.
(This interpretation derives naturally from the proposition that formal
systems and minds are largely the same thing, and that human minds are
merely particularly complex systems. I grew up on Hofstadter and I'm
proud of it.)
Gratuitous Arguments by ais523: | | (14 Oct 2009 18:14:43 GMT) |
The issue here is about whether intent is an action (therefore, this
ties in with the arguments about the Points Party). The LNP was picked
here because it cannot act on its own; only via act-on-behalf. If intent
is indeed an action, then everything worked just fine. If it isn't,
however, the quoted part of R2263 prevented the intent from working, by
preventing the LNP doing anything at all; (a) wasn't met, as no message
was given, and (b) and (c) cannot be met unless an action is involved.
So the LNP registered if and only if an intent is an action.
Gratuitous Evidence by ais523: | | (14 Oct 2009 18:14:43 GMT) |
The text of the LNP:
{{{
A Livenomicer CAN act on behalf of the LNP to cause it to intend,
with Agoran Consent, to register, and to resolve this intent.
}}}
R2263:
{{{
Rules to the contrary notwithstanding, acting on behalf of a
person is INVALID if not published. Such publication is INVALID
unless it specified the text of the simulated message by:
(a) clearly stating the text of a message;
(b) clearly specifying an action (the message states the grantor
performs the action); or
(c) performing by announcement an action defined in a public
contract's text to (clearly and unambiguously) include
causing the grantor to perform a specific action (the
message states the grantor performs the action)
}}}